Toshiba Corporate Research & Development Center, 1 Komukai-Toshiba-Cho, Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, 212-8582, Japan.
Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, 208 Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge, CB4 0GZ, UK.
Sci Rep. 2017 May 16;7(1):1978. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-01884-0.
Quantum key distribution's (QKD's) central and unique claim is information theoretic security. However there is an increasing understanding that the security of a QKD system relies not only on theoretical security proofs, but also on how closely the physical system matches the theoretical models and prevents attacks due to discrepancies. These side channel or hacking attacks exploit physical devices which do not necessarily behave precisely as the theory expects. As such there is a need for QKD systems to be demonstrated to provide security both in the theoretical and physical implementation. We report here a QKD system designed with this goal in mind, providing a more resilient target against possible hacking attacks including Trojan horse, detector blinding, phase randomisation and photon number splitting attacks. The QKD system was installed into a 45 km link of a metropolitan telecom network for a 2.5 month period, during which time the system operated continuously and distributed 1.33 Tbits of secure key data with a stable secure key rate over 200 kbit/s. In addition security is demonstrated against coherent attacks that are more general than the collective class of attacks usually considered.
量子密钥分发（QKD）的核心和独特主张是信息理论安全性。然而，人们越来越认识到，QKD 系统的安全性不仅依赖于理论安全证明，还依赖于物理系统与理论模型的匹配程度以及防止因差异而导致的攻击。这些旁路或黑客攻击利用物理设备，这些物理设备的行为不一定完全符合理论预期。因此，需要证明 QKD 系统在理论和物理实现中都能提供安全性。我们在这里报告了一个设计用于实现这一目标的 QKD 系统，为可能的黑客攻击提供了更强的抵御能力，包括木马、探测器致盲、相位随机化和光子数分裂攻击。该 QKD 系统被安装在一个 45 公里长的城市电信网络链路中，运行了 2.5 个月，在此期间，系统连续运行，分发了 1.33 太比特的安全密钥数据，稳定的安全密钥率超过 200 千比特/秒。此外，该系统还证明了对相干攻击的安全性，这种攻击比通常考虑的集体攻击类更为普遍。
