Orne M T, Dinges D F, Orne E C
Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia 19139-2798.
Int J Clin Exp Hypn. 1990 Oct;38(4):250-65. doi: 10.1080/00207149008414526.
In Rock v. Arkansas (1987) the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 5 to 4 decision that the constitutional rights of defendants to testify on their own behalf take precedence over whatever state rules exist regarding exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The problem of denying defendants their constitutional rights was the reason we have argued that defendants' hypnotically refreshed testimony should generally be permitted, whereas the unreliability of hypnotically elicited memories and the manner in which hypnosis diminishes the effectiveness of cross-examination make the general exclusion of testimony from hypnotized witnesses essential (M. T. Orne, 1982). We discuss the Rock case, as well as the majority and minority opinions expressed by the United States Supreme Court, and offer reasons why a bifurcated standard--one that admits hypnotically refreshed testimony from defendants and excludes it from witnesses--is consistent both with the Court's ruling and with the scientific evidence regarding the use of hypnosis, as well as being an appropriately fair way in which to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant and the state.
在“罗克诉阿肯色州案”（1987年）中，美国最高法院以5比4的裁决判定，被告为自己作证的宪法权利优先于任何关于排除催眠后恢复的证言的州规则。剥夺被告宪法权利的问题正是我们主张一般应允许被告催眠后恢复的证言的原因，而催眠引发的记忆的不可靠性以及催眠削弱交叉询问有效性的方式使得普遍排除催眠证人的证言至关重要（M. T. 奥恩，1982年）。我们讨论了“罗克案”以及美国最高法院表达的多数意见和少数意见，并阐述了为何采用一种 bifurcated 标准——即允许被告催眠后恢复的证言而排除证人的此类证言——既符合最高法院的裁决，又与关于催眠使用的科学证据一致，同时也是保护被告和州宪法权利的一种适当公平的方式。
