School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh.
Top Cogn Sci. 2012 Jul;4(3):413-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01200.x. Epub 2012 Jun 8.
Several of Beller, Bender, and Medin's (2012) issues are as relevant within cognitive science as between it and anthropology. Knowledge-rich human mental processes impose hermeneutic tasks, both on subjects and researchers. Psychology's current philosophy of science is ill suited to analyzing these: Its demand for ''stimulus control'' needs to give way to ''negotiation of mutual interpretation.'' Cognitive science has ways to address these issues, as does anthropology. An example from my own work is about how defeasible logics are mathematical models of some aspects of simple hermeneutic processes. They explain processing relative to databases of knowledge and belief-that is, content. A specific example is syllogistic reasoning, which raises issues of experimenters' interpretations of subjects' reasoning. Science, especially since the advent of understandings of computation, does not have to be reductive. How does this approach transfer onto anthropological topics? Recent cognitive science approaches to anthropological topics have taken a reductive stance in terms of modules. We end with some speculations about a different cognitive approach to, for example, religion.
贝勒、本德和梅丁（2012）的几个问题在认知科学内部和认知科学与人类学之间同样相关。知识丰富的人类心理过程既给主体也给研究人员带来了解释学任务。心理学当前的科学哲学不适合分析这些问题：它对“刺激控制”的需求需要让位于“相互解释的协商”。认知科学和人类学都有解决这些问题的方法。我自己工作中的一个例子是，可废止逻辑如何成为简单解释过程某些方面的数学模型。它们解释了相对于知识和信仰数据库（即内容）的处理。一个具体的例子是三段论推理，它提出了实验者对主体推理的解释问题。科学，尤其是自从理解计算出现以来，不一定非得是还原性的。这种方法如何转移到人类学主题上？最近认知科学对人类学主题的方法在模块方面采取了还原性立场。我们最后对认知科学对宗教等主题的不同方法进行了一些推测。
