Strong Kimberly, Kerridge Ian, Little Miles
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney.
Bioethics. 2014 May;28(4):187-93. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.02001.x. Epub 2012 Jul 29.
Philosophy has long been concerned with 'moral status'. Discussions about the moral status of children, however, seem often to promote confusion rather than clarity. Using the creation of 'savior siblings' as an example, this paper provides a philosophical critique of the moral status of children and the moral relevance of parenting and the role that formative experience, regret and relational autonomy play in parental decisions. We suggest that parents make moral decisions that are guided by the moral significance they attach to children, to sick children and most importantly, to a specific sick child (theirs). This moral valorization is rarely made explicit and has generally been ignored by both philosophers and clinicians in previous critiques. Recognizing this, however, may transform not only the focus of bioethical discourse but also the policies and practices surrounding the care of children requiring bone marrow or cord blood transplantation by better understanding the values at stake behind parental decision making.
长期以来,哲学一直关注“道德地位”。然而,关于儿童道德地位的讨论似乎常常引发混乱而非澄清。以“救世主同胞”的创造为例,本文对儿童的道德地位、育儿的道德相关性以及形成性经历、遗憾和关系自主性在父母决策中所起的作用进行了哲学批判。我们认为,父母做出的道德决策是由他们赋予孩子、患病孩子尤其是特定患病孩子(他们自己的孩子)的道德重要性所引导的。这种道德重视很少被明确表达,并且在以往的批判中普遍被哲学家和临床医生所忽视。然而,认识到这一点不仅可能改变生物伦理话语的焦点,还可能通过更好地理解父母决策背后所涉及的价值观,改变围绕需要骨髓或脐血移植的儿童护理的政策和做法。