Institute of Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Top Cogn Sci. 2012 Oct;4(4):740-58. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01219.x. Epub 2012 Aug 14.
There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. Embodiment is thus understood in terms of the role the body plays in supporting the computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues by contrast that no computational account of cognition can account for the role of commonsense knowledge in our everyday practical engagement with the world. I will attempt a reconciliation of these seemingly opposed views.
在具身认知科学的哲学家中间，对于具身的含义存在着很大的分歧。在接下来的内容中，我将描述当前文献中可以找到的三种不同观点。我将展示这场争论是如何围绕着具身认知科学是否能够保留心智的计算机理论这一问题展开的。一种观点，我将其标记为身体功能主义，认为身体起着将解决问题的外部资源与内部生物机制联系起来的功能作用。因此，具身是根据身体在实现认知的计算回路中的作用来理解的。相比之下，身体主动主义认为，任何认知的计算解释都无法解释常识知识在我们日常与世界互动中的作用。我将尝试调和这些看似对立的观点。
