Clark Andy
University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom.
J Med Philos. 2007 May-Jun;32(3):263-82. doi: 10.1080/03605310701397024.
Recent advances in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new human-machine interfaces (in general) and new brain-machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the increasing prominence of such ideas, the very idea of such an interface remains surprisingly under-explored. In particular, the notion of human enhancement suggests an image of the embodied and reasoning agent as literally extended or augmented, rather than the more conservative image of a standard (non-enhanced) agent using a tool via some new interface. In this essay, I explore this difference, and attempt to lay out some of the conditions under which the more radical reading (positing brand new integrated agents or systemic wholes) becomes justified. I adduce some empirical evidence suggesting that the radical result is well within our scientific reach. The main reason why this is so has less to do with the advancement of our science (though that certainly helps) than with our native biological plasticity. We humans, I shall try to show, are biologically disposed towards literal (and repeated) episodes of sensory re-calibration, of bodily re-configuration and of mental extension. Such potential for literal and repeated re-configuration is the mark of what I shall call "profoundly embodied agency," contrasting it with a variety of weaker (less philosophically and scientifically interesting) understandings of the nature and importance of embodiment for minds and persons. The article ends by relating the image of profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning converging technologies for improving human performance.
认知科学和认知神经科学的最新进展为人类增强开辟了新的前景。这项工作的核心是新的人机界面（一般而言）和新的脑机接口（尤其如此）的概念。但是，尽管这些概念越来越突出，但这种界面的概念仍然令人惊讶地未得到充分探索。特别是，人类增强的概念暗示了具身化和推理主体的形象是字面上的扩展或增强，而不是标准（未增强）主体通过某种新界面使用工具的更为保守的形象。在本文中，我探讨了这种差异，并试图阐述在哪些条件下更激进的解读（假定全新的整合主体或系统整体）是合理的。我列举了一些经验证据，表明这种激进的结果完全在我们的科学能力范围之内。之所以如此，主要原因与其说是我们科学的进步（尽管这肯定有帮助），不如说是我们天生的生物可塑性。我将试图表明，我们人类在生物学上倾向于经历字面意义上的（且反复的）感官重新校准、身体重新配置和心智扩展过程。这种字面意义上的和反复的重新配置的潜力是我所称的“深度具身化能动性”的标志，将其与对心智和个人具身化的本质和重要性的各种较弱（在哲学和科学上不太有趣）的理解形成对比。文章最后将深度具身化的形象与一些关于改善人类表现的融合技术的问题（和担忧）联系起来。
