Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2012 Nov 21;313:42-60. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.019. Epub 2012 Aug 15.
The evolution of many forms of mimicry are well understood, but the evolution of mimicry in the absence of aposematic models or third party participants remains poorly understood. This paper presents a model of the evolution of interspecific social dominance mimicry (ISDM), that does not rely on third-party observers, in the context of the Hairy-Downy game. Members of a socially dominant species contest a resource by playing the hawk-dove game. Nonmimic members of a subordinate species surrender the resource whenever encountering a member of the dominant species, and split the resource whenever interacting among themselves. Mimicry allows members of the subordinate species to pose as members of the dominant species who play dove, splitting the resource when facing other dominant doves while continuing to surrender the resource to dominant hawks. We characterize the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium behavior of this game, developing conditions under which evolution will select for mimicry, and under which the subordinate species will consist (almost or even literally) entirely of mimics.
许多形式的拟态进化已经得到很好的理解，但在没有警戒模型或第三方参与者的情况下，拟态的进化仍然知之甚少。本文提出了一种在 Hairy-Downy 博弈中不依赖第三方观察者的种间社会优势拟态 (ISDM) 进化模型。在社会主导物种中，成员通过玩鹰鸽博弈来争夺资源。从属物种的非模拟成员在遇到主导物种的成员时，随时放弃资源，并在相互作用时分割资源。模仿使从属物种的成员能够扮演扮演鸽派的主导物种成员，在面对其他主导鸽派时分割资源，而继续向主导鹰派投降资源。我们描述了这个游戏的进化动态和平衡行为，制定了选择模仿的进化条件，以及在这些条件下，从属物种将（几乎或甚至完全）完全由模仿者组成。
