Interacting Minds Centre, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
Exp Brain Res. 2013 Sep;229(3):289-99. doi: 10.1007/s00221-013-3407-6. Epub 2013 Jan 25.
Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans.
意志可以从两个角度进行研究。从第三人称的角度来看,意志行为是内部产生的,而不是由当前的环境决定的,因此在某种程度上是不可预测的。这种行为并非人类所独有,因为在许多其他物种中也可以看到,包括无脊椎动物。从第一人称的角度来看,我们对意志行为的体验包括一种强烈的主体感。我们觉得,通过我们的意图,我们可以让事情发生,我们可以在不同的行动之间做出选择。我们对主体的体验不是直接的。它取决于从先前的期望和与运动相关的感觉中得出的次人格推断。因此,我们对意志的体验可能是不可靠和不确定的。然而,我们的主体体验并非仅仅是一种副现象。对做出错误选择后可能会感到后悔的预期会改变行为。此外,与主体相关的强烈责任感在创造社会凝聚力和群体利益方面发挥着关键作用。我们只能在能够描述自己体验的人类身上研究主体体验。对意志体验的讨论,即内省和交流,使得改变意志行为的体验成为可能。因此,主体、后悔和责任是人类特有的文化现象。