School of Pharmacy, University of Camerino, Camerino, Italy.
J Eval Clin Pract. 2013 Jun;19(3):454-62. doi: 10.1111/jep.12039.
The problem of collecting, analysing and evaluating evidence on adverse drug reactions is an example of the more general class of epistemological problems related to scientific inference and prediction, as well as a central problem of health care practice. Philosophical discussions have analysed critically the methodological pitfalls and epistemological implications of evidence assessment in medicine; however, they have focused predominantly on evidence of treatment efficacy. Most of this work is devoted to statistical methods of causal inference with a special focus on the privileged role assigned to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in evidence-based medicine. Regardless of whether the RCT's privilege holds for efficacy assessment, it is nevertheless important to make a distinction between causal inference in relation to intended and unintended effects, in that the unknowns at stake are heterogeneous in the two contexts. This point has been emphasized by epidemiologists in the last decade. Their primary focus is methodological and regards the fact that bias and confounding factors do not affect studies on intended and unintended effects in the same way. However, deeper concerns ground the intuition for such a distinction; these are related to the constraints we impose on evidence and their epistemological justification. My thesis is that such constraints ought to be understood as being different in evidence for risk versus for efficacy. I present the recent debate on the causal association between acetaminophen and asthma in order to illustrate the point at issue. The upshot of my analysis is that different epistemologies confer different methodological choices, which in turn bring about relevant practical implications such as the decision to restrict or suspend drug use rather than leaving it on the market. Thus, it is worth considering the criteria underlying our evidence constraints because they may be ill suited to the purpose for which they are used.
药物不良反应证据的收集、分析和评估问题是与科学推理和预测相关的更广泛的认识论问题的一个例子,也是医疗保健实践的一个核心问题。哲学讨论批判性地分析了医学证据评估中的方法论陷阱和认识论含义;然而,它们主要集中在治疗效果的证据上。这项工作的大部分致力于因果推理的统计方法,特别关注随机对照试验(RCT)在循证医学中的特权地位。无论 RCT 在疗效评估中的特权是否成立,在与预期和非预期效应相关的因果推理中做出区分仍然很重要,因为在这两种情况下,所涉及的未知数是不同的。这一点在过去十年中被流行病学家强调。他们的主要关注点是方法学方面,涉及到偏倚和混杂因素对预期和非预期效应研究的影响方式不同。然而,更深层次的担忧为这种区分提供了依据;这些担忧与我们对证据的限制及其认识论依据有关。我的论点是,这种限制应该被理解为风险证据和疗效证据的区别。我提出了最近关于对乙酰氨基酚与哮喘之间因果关系的争论,以说明问题所在。我分析的结果是,不同的认识论赋予了不同的方法选择,这反过来又带来了相关的实际影响,例如决定限制或停止药物使用,而不是将其留在市场上。因此,值得考虑我们证据限制的依据,因为它们可能不适合它们的用途。