Institut de Neurosciences de la Timone, CNRS UMR 7289, Aix-Marseille Université Marseille, France ; Assistance Publique - Department of Psychiatry, Hôpitaux de Marseille, Sainte Marguerite University Hospital Marseille, France.
Front Psychol. 2013 May 16;4:250. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00250. eCollection 2013.
Everyone has experienced the potential discrepancy between what one judges as morally acceptable and what one actually does when a choice between alternative behaviors is to be made. The present study explores empirically whether judgment and choice of action differ when people make decisions on dilemmas involving moral issues. Two hundred and forty participants evaluated 24 moral and non-moral dilemmas either by judging ("Is it acceptable to…") or reporting the choice of action they would make ("Would you do…"). We also investigated the influence of varying the number of people benefiting from the decision and the closeness of relationship of the decision maker with the potential victim on these two types of decision. Variations in the number of beneficiaries from the decision did not influence judgment nor choice of action. By contrast, closeness of relationship with the victim had a greater influence on the choice of action than on judgment. This differentiation between evaluative judgments and choices of action argues in favor of each of them being supported by (at least partially) different psychological processes.
当人们需要在不同的行为选择之间做出决定时，他们所判断的道德上可接受的行为与实际做出的行为之间存在差异。本研究实证探讨了人们在涉及道德问题的困境中做出决策时，判断和行为选择是否存在差异。240 名参与者通过判断（“……是否可以接受”）或报告他们将做出的行为选择（“你会……吗”），对 24 个道德和非道德困境进行了评估。我们还研究了在决策中受益人数和决策者与潜在受害者关系的亲密程度的变化对这两种决策类型的影响。决策中受益人数的变化既不影响判断，也不影响行为选择。相比之下，与受害者关系的亲密程度对行为选择的影响大于对判断的影响。这种评估判断和行为选择之间的差异，支持了它们各自由（至少部分）不同的心理过程支持的观点。
