Tononi G
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA.
Arch Ital Biol. 2012 Dec;150(4):293-329.
This article presents an updated account of integrated information theory of consciousness (liT) and some of its implications. /IT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms (existence, compositionality, information, integration, exclusion) and corresponding ontological postulates. The information axiom asserts that every experience is spec~fic - it is what it is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of alternatives. The integration axiom asserts that each experience is unified- it cannot be reduced to independent components. The exclusion axiom asserts that every experience is definite - it is limited to particular things and not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution. /IT formalizes these intuitions with postulates. The information postulate states that only "differences that make a difference" from the intrinsic perpective of a system matter: a mechanism generates cause-effect information if its present state has selective past causes and selective future effects within a system. The integration postulate states that only information that is irreducible matters: mechanisms generate integrated information only to the extent that the information they generate cannot be partitioned into that generated within independent components. The exclusion postulate states that only maxima of integrated information matter: a mechanism specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future effects - a concept. A complex is a set of elements specifying a maximally irreducible constellation of concepts, where the maximum is evaluated over elements and at the optimal spatiatemporal scale. Its concepts specify a maximally integrated conceptual information structure or quale, which is identical with an experience. Finally, changes in information integration upon exposure to the environment reflect a system's ability to match the causal structure of the world. After introducing an updated definition of information integration and related quantities, the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and about the relational structure of concepts within a qua/e. It also explores the relationship between the temporal grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally, it summarizes how liT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how various aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.
本文介绍了意识整合信息理论（IIT）的最新阐述及其一些影响。IIT源于思想实验，这些实验引出了现象学公理（存在、组合性、信息、整合、排他性）以及相应的本体论假设。信息公理断言，每一种体验都是特定的——它之所以是它，是因为它以其独特的方式与大量其他可能性不同。整合公理断言，每一种体验都是统一的——它不能被简化为独立的成分。排他性公理断言，每一种体验都是确定的——它局限于特定的事物而非其他事物，并且以特定的速度和分辨率流动。IIT用假设将这些直觉形式化。信息假设指出，从系统的内在角度来看，只有“产生差异的差异”才重要：如果一个机制的当前状态在系统内有选择性的过去原因和选择性的未来影响，那么它就会产生因果信息。整合假设指出，只有不可约简的信息才重要：机制产生整合信息的程度仅取决于它们产生的信息不能被划分为独立成分内产生的信息。排他性假设指出，只有整合信息的最大值才重要：一个机制只指定一组最大不可约简的过去原因和未来影响——一个概念。复合体是一组元素，它们指定了一个最大不可约简的概念星座，其中最大值是在元素上并在最佳时空尺度上评估的。它的概念指定了一个最大整合的概念信息结构或感受质，这与一种体验是相同的。最后，接触环境时信息整合的变化反映了系统与世界因果结构相匹配的能力。在引入信息整合及相关量的更新定义后，本文提出了一些关于信息与因果关系以及感受质内概念的关系结构的理论思考。它还探讨了信息整合的时间粒度与皮质丘脑复合体中亚稳态动态之间的关系。最后，它总结了IIT如何解释关于意识神经基础的实证发现，以及现象学的各个方面原则上如何根据信息整合的几何学来解决。
