Champagne-Lavau Maud, Moreau Noémie
CNRS, Aix-Marseille Université
Psychol Assess. 2013 Dec;25(4):1404-6. doi: 10.1037/a0033433.
In a recent article, Achim et al. (2013) discussed the different sources of information that contribute to mentalizing judgments in current theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks. The authors rightly emphasized the dynamic aspect of real-life social interaction, suggesting that taking account of the ongoing changes occurring during social interaction would make ToM tasks more ecological. They proposed a framework (i.e., the Eight Sources of Information Framework) that specifies the 8 sources of information we get from the environment and/or from our memories to attribute mental states to others. Nevertheless, we believe that a central aspect of ToM is missing in this framework: the engagement (or not) of the participant in the social interaction during ToM assessment. Indeed, this framework fails to consider how the participant who takes part in the ToM task manages this information, depending on the fact that he or she is involved in the interaction or not and how the information concerning the agent may impact the participant attribution of mental states. We reviewed several arguments and results from the ToM literature suggesting that merely observing a social interaction is not equivalent to participating in an interaction in terms of cognitive processes involved in the attribution of mental states to others.
在最近的一篇文章中,阿希姆等人(2013年)讨论了在当前心理理论(ToM)任务中有助于心理化判断的不同信息来源。作者正确地强调了现实生活中社会互动的动态方面,表明考虑社会互动过程中正在发生的变化会使ToM任务更具生态效度。他们提出了一个框架(即“八种信息来源框架”),该框架明确了我们从环境和/或记忆中获取的用于将心理状态归因于他人的8种信息来源。然而,我们认为这个框架缺少ToM的一个核心方面:在ToM评估过程中参与者是否参与社会互动。的确,这个框架没有考虑参与ToM任务的参与者是如何处理这些信息的,这取决于他或她是否参与互动,以及关于行为主体的信息如何影响参与者对心理状态的归因。我们回顾了ToM文献中的几个论点和结果,这些表明就将心理状态归因于他人所涉及的认知过程而言,仅仅观察社会互动并不等同于参与互动。