Jeffrey Cheah School of Medicine and Health Sciences, Monash University Bandar Sunway, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia.
Front Psychol. 2013 Dec 9;4:920. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00920. eCollection 2013.
This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection, and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments (e.g., Wegner, 2003; Harris, 2012) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together, these findings can also support an alternative conception of free will. The constructive nature of memory and an integrative "default network" provide the means for novel and creative combinations of information, such as the imagining of counterfactual scenarios and alternative courses of action. Considering recent findings of extensive functional connections between these systems and those that subsume motor control and goal maintenance, it is argued that individuals have the capability of producing novel ideas and translating them into actionable goals. Although most of these processes take place beneath conscious awareness, it is argued that they are unique to the individual and thus, can be considered a form of independent control over behavior, or free will.
本文旨在结合心理学和神经科学的最新研究，探讨自由意志或自主行动的概念。通过回顾记忆、展望、心理模拟以及行为控制、规划和整合的神经机制等方面的发现，我们认为，应该摒弃民间普遍认为的自由意志是对行为完全有意识控制的观念。然而，本文也提出，综合来看，这些发现也可以支持另一种自由意志的概念。记忆的建构性和整合的“默认网络”为信息的新颖和创造性组合提供了手段，例如对反事实情景和替代行动方案的想象。考虑到这些系统与涵盖运动控制和目标维持的系统之间存在广泛的功能连接的最新发现，本文认为，个体有能力产生新的想法并将其转化为可执行的目标。尽管这些过程大多发生在意识之外，但本文认为它们是个体特有的，因此可以被视为对行为或自由意志的一种独立控制形式。
