Schacter Daniel L, Benoit Roland G, De Brigard Felipe, Szpunar Karl K
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
Neurobiol Learn Mem. 2015 Jan;117:14-21. doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008. Epub 2013 Dec 25.
This article considers two recent lines of research concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated events that can provide insight into the relationship between memory and decision making. One line of research concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which involves simulating episodes that could have happened in one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of episodic simulation engage a common core network including medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging studies have documented neural differences between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, including differences in hippocampal responses. We next consider behavioral studies that have delineated both similarities and differences between the two kinds of episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for decisions.
本文探讨了最近两条与构建想象或模拟事件相关的研究路线,这些研究能够深入了解记忆与决策之间的关系。一条研究路线涉及情景未来思维,即模拟个人未来可能发生的情景;另一条涉及情景反事实思维,即模拟个人过去本可能发生的情景。我们首先回顾了神经影像学研究,这些研究考察了情景未来思维和情景反事实思维的神经基础。我们认为,这些研究表明这两种情景模拟形式都涉及一个共同的核心网络,包括内侧顶叶、前额叶和颞叶区域,这些区域也支持情景记忆。我们还指出,神经影像学研究记录了情景未来思维和情景反事实思维之间的神经差异,包括海马反应的差异。接下来,我们考虑行为学研究,这些研究明确了两种情景模拟之间的异同。证据表明,与情景记忆相比,情景未来思维和反事实思维的特点都是特定细节水平同样降低,但反复想象一种可能的经历对这些事件在情景未来思维和情景反事实思维过程中感知到的可信度有截然不同的影响。最后,我们通过讨论未来模拟和反事实模拟对决策的功能影响来得出结论。