Meng Lingpeng, Kang Qi, Han Chuanfeng, Xu Weisheng, Wu Qidi
Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China ; Institute of Urban Construction and Emergency Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China.
Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China.
ScientificWorldJournal. 2013 Dec 28;2013:742845. doi: 10.1155/2013/742845. eCollection 2013.
This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed. The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China.
本文关注容量限制对反恐应急设施选址的影响。我们假设国家资源有限，并且在需求最终得到满足之前，可能会有多个设施参与应急响应。我们构建了一个国家与恐怖分子之间的领导者—追随者博弈模型，并证明了纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。当设施数量固定时，提出了一个整数线性规划来获得均衡结果。通过对中国上海市19个区的案例研究对该问题进行了论证。
