School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Zhaoqing University, China.
Environ Res. 2021 Mar;194:110737. doi: 10.1016/j.envres.2021.110737. Epub 2021 Jan 15.
The proposed model determines the allocation of security forces in response to terrorist events with a series of coordinated attacks such as the Paris terror attacks in 2015. Two games are constructed, representing the two stages needed for the rapid deployment of security forces. The first stage applies a firearms assault game to analyze the interaction behaviors between the response agent (or security force commander) and the attackers in each response district. The terrorist threat value (TV) during a firearms assault event can then be derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The TVs are input to the second stage for computing the Shapley value for each event, in terms of the majority of TVs of all firearms assaults. The Shapley values are then used to create a set for reallocation of the limited security forces to respond to the multiple firearms assaults. The experimental results show the proposed division to fairer than the proportional division for allocating security forces.
该模型针对一系列协调攻击事件（如 2015 年巴黎恐怖袭击事件），提出了一种安全部队分配方案。构建了两个博弈，分别代表快速部署安全部队所需的两个阶段。第一阶段应用火力攻击博弈来分析每个响应区域中响应代理（或安全部队指挥官）和攻击者之间的交互行为。然后可以从混合策略纳什均衡中得出火力攻击事件期间的恐怖威胁值（TV）。将这些 TV 值输入到第二阶段，以计算每个事件的 Shapley 值，即所有火力攻击的大多数 TV 值。然后，使用 Shapley 值为应对多个火力攻击重新分配有限的安全部队创建一个集合。实验结果表明，与按比例分配安全部队相比，所提出的分配方案更公平。
