Saunders Ben
J Med Ethics. 2015 Feb;41(2):175-8. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2013-101711. Epub 2014 Feb 12.
Julian Savulescu defends the principle of procreative beneficence, according to which parents have a prima facie moral obligation to choose the child with the best expected life. In this paper, I argue that Savulescu fails to show that procreative beneficence is genuinely obligatory, because of his equivocation between moral reason and moral obligation. Savulescu assumes that morality requires us to do what we have most (moral) reason to do, but many deny this, for instance because they believe we have reasons (but no obligation) to perform supererogatory actions. Even if parents have moral reasons to choose the child with the best expected life, they may not be under any obligation to do so.
朱利安·萨夫勒斯库为生殖性慈善原则辩护，根据这一原则，父母初步看来有道义责任选择预期生活最佳的孩子。在本文中，我认为萨夫勒斯库未能表明生殖性慈善是真正具有强制性的，因为他在道德理由和道德义务之间存在含糊不清之处。萨夫勒斯库假定道德要求我们去做我们最有（道德）理由做的事情，但许多人否认这一点，例如因为他们认为我们有理由（但没有义务）去做分外之事。即使父母有道德理由选择预期生活最佳的孩子，他们也可能没有任何义务这样做。
