Saunders Ben
University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
J Med Philos. 2015 Dec;40(6):653-68. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhv026. Epub 2015 Oct 8.
According to the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, reproducers should choose the child, of those available to them, expected to have the best life. Savulescu argues reproducers are therefore morally obligated to select for nondisease traits, such as intelligence. Carter and Gordon recently challenged this implication, arguing that Savulescu fails to establish that intelligence promotes well-being. This paper develops two responses. First, I argue that higher intelligence is likely to contribute to well-being on most plausible accounts. Second, I argue that, even if it does not, one can only resist the conclusion that reproducers should select on the basis of intelligence if its expected net effect is neutral. If intelligence reduces expected well-being, then reproducers should select offspring of low intelligence. More likely, the effect of increased intelligence on expected well-being varies at different levels, which makes identifying an optimum for well-being more complex than hitherto appreciated.
根据生殖利他主义原则，生殖者应该从他们所能选择的孩子中，挑选出预期会拥有最佳生活的孩子。萨夫勒斯库认为，因此生殖者在道德上有义务选择非疾病特征，比如智力。卡特和戈登最近对这一观点提出了质疑，他们认为萨夫勒斯库未能证明智力能增进福祉。本文提出两种回应。第一，我认为在大多数合理的解释中，较高的智力很可能有助于增进福祉。第二，我认为，即便并非如此，只有当智力的预期净效应为中性时，人们才能拒绝生殖者应该基于智力进行选择这一结论。如果智力会降低预期福祉，那么生殖者应该选择低智力的后代。更有可能的是，智力提升对预期福祉的影响在不同水平上有所不同，这使得确定福祉的最优值比迄今所认识到的更为复杂。
