Deck Cary, Kimbrough Erik O, Mongrain Steeve
Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, United States of America.
Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada.
PLoS One. 2014 Mar 25;9(3):e92070. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0092070. eCollection 2014.
We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically. Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller provides two separate queues, each with its own server, while the other seller has a single queue and server. We explore the market impact of the multi-server seller engaging in waiting cost-based-price discrimination by charging a premium for express checkout. Specifically, we analyze this situation computationally and through the use of controlled laboratory experiments. We find that this form of price discrimination is harmful to sellers and beneficial to consumers. When the two-queue seller offers express checkout for impatient customers, the single queue seller focuses on the patient shoppers thereby driving down prices and profits while increasing consumer surplus.
我们构建了一个模型，用于描述向随机进入市场的顾客销售相同商品的两家公司之间的竞争情况。购物者会根据价格以及等待服务服务服务所需的时间成本来选择购买地点。一家卖家提供两条独立的队列，每个队列都有自己的服务人员，而另一家卖家只有一个队列和一名服务人员。我们探讨了多服务人员卖家通过对快速结账收取额外费用，实施基于等待成本的价格歧视所产生的市场影响。具体而言，我们通过计算以及控制实验室实验来分析这种情况。我们发现，这种价格歧视形式对卖家有害，对消费者有益。当提供两条队列的卖家为没有耐心的顾客提供快速结账服务时，只有一条队列的卖家则专注于有耐心的购物者，从而压低了价格和利润，同时增加了消费者剩余。
