Keeler T E, Hu T W, Barnett P G, Manning W G, Sung H Y
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley 94720, USA.
J Health Econ. 1996 Aug;15(4):499-512. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(96)00498-5.
This study analyzes the interactive effects of oligopoly pricing, state taxation, and anti-smoking regulations on retail cigarette prices by state, using panel data for the 50 US states between 1960 and 1990. The results indicate that cigarette producers do price-discriminate by state, though the effect is not large relative to the final retail price. There are two further results: (1) state taxes are more than passed on - a 1-cent state tax increase results in a price increase of 1.11 cents, and (2) sellers offset state and local anti-smoking laws with lower prices, thereby blunting effects of the regulations.
本研究利用1960年至1990年间美国50个州的面板数据,分析了寡头垄断定价、州税收和禁烟法规对各州零售卷烟价格的交互影响。结果表明,卷烟生产商确实会按州进行价格歧视,不过相对于最终零售价而言,这种影响并不大。还有另外两个结果:(1)州税收的转嫁幅度超过了税收增长幅度——州税收每增加1美分,价格就会上涨1.11美分;(2)卖家通过降低价格来抵消州和地方法规,从而削弱了这些法规的效果。