Craver Carl F, Kwan Donna, Steindam Chloe, Rosenbaum R Shayna
Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University, 1 Brookings Drive St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA.
Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3.
Neuropsychologia. 2014 May;57:191-5. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.03.004. Epub 2014 Mar 26.
The metaphor that individuals with episodic amnesia due to hippocampal damage are "stuck in time" persists in science, philosophy, and everyday life despite mounting evidence that episodic amnesia can spare many central aspects of temporal consciousness. Here we describe some of this evidence, focusing specifically on KC, one of the most thoroughly documented and severe cases of episodic amnesia on record. KC understands the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future. He expresses typical attitudes toward his past and future, and he is able to make future-regarding decisions. Theories claiming that the hippocampus plays an essential role in temporal consciousness need to be revised in light of these findings.
尽管越来越多的证据表明,情景性失忆症可以保留时间意识的许多核心方面,但因海马体损伤而患有情景性失忆症的个体“被困在时间里”这一隐喻在科学、哲学和日常生活中依然存在。在此,我们描述其中一些证据,特别聚焦于KC,他是有记录以来记录最为详尽且病情最为严重的情景性失忆症病例之一。KC理解时间的概念,知道时间在流逝,并且能够定位自己相对于个人过去和未来的位置。他对自己的过去和未来表达出典型的态度,并且能够做出关乎未来的决定。鉴于这些发现,那些声称海马体在时间意识中起关键作用的理论需要加以修正。