Rae Babette, Heathcote Andrew, Donkin Chris, Averell Lee, Brown Scott
School of Psychology, University of Newcastle.
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 2014 Sep;40(5):1226-43. doi: 10.1037/a0036801. Epub 2014 May 5.
Decision-makers effortlessly balance the need for urgency against the need for caution. Theoretical and neurophysiological accounts have explained this tradeoff solely in terms of the quantity of evidence required to trigger a decision (the "threshold"). This explanation has also been used as a benchmark test for evaluating new models of decision making, but the explanation itself has not been carefully tested against data. We rigorously test the assumption that emphasizing decision speed versus decision accuracy selectively influences only decision thresholds. In data from a new brightness discrimination experiment we found that emphasizing decision speed over decision accuracy not only decreases the amount of evidence required for a decision but also decreases the quality of information being accumulated during the decision process. This result was consistent for 2 leading decision-making models and in a model-free test. We also found the same model-based results in archival data from a lexical decision task (reported by Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008) and new data from a recognition memory task. We discuss discuss implications for theoretical development and applications.
决策者能轻松地在紧迫性需求和谨慎性需求之间取得平衡。理论和神经生理学的解释仅从触发决策所需的证据量(“阈值”)方面说明了这种权衡。这种解释也被用作评估新决策模型的基准测试,但该解释本身尚未针对数据进行仔细检验。我们严格检验了这样一个假设,即强调决策速度与决策准确性只会选择性地影响决策阈值。在一项新的亮度辨别实验数据中,我们发现,相较于决策准确性,强调决策速度不仅会减少做出决策所需的证据量,还会降低决策过程中积累的信息质量。这一结果在两种主要的决策模型以及一项无模型测试中都是一致的。我们还在一项词汇判断任务的存档数据(由瓦根梅克斯、拉特克利夫、戈麦斯和麦昆于2008年报告)以及一项识别记忆任务的新数据中发现了基于相同模型的结果。我们讨论了这对理论发展和应用的影响。