CNRS, BioMécanique et BioIngénierie, UMR 7338, Université de Technologie de Compiègne Compiègne, France.
Front Psychol. 2014 Jun 12;5:594. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00594. eCollection 2014.
This article proposes a theoretical reflection on the conditions for the constitution of a distinction between the self and the world by a cognitive system. The main hypothesis is the following: proprioception, as a sensory system that is habitually dedicated essentially to experience of the body, is conceived here as a coupling which is necessary for the dual and concomitant constitution of a bodily self and of a distal perceptual field. After recalling the singular characteristics of proprioceptive coupling, three lines of thought are developed. The first, which is notably inspired by research on sensory substitution, aims at emphasizing the indispensable role of action in the context of such perceptual learning. In a second part, this hypothesis is tested against opposing arguments. In particular, we shall discuss, in the context of what Braitenberg called a synthetic psychology, the emergence of oriented behaviors in simple robots that can be regulated by sensory regulations which are strictly external, since these robots do not have any form of "proprioception." In the same vein, this part also provides the opportunity to discuss the argument concerning a bijective relation between action and proprioception; it has been argued by others that because of this strict bijection it is not possible for proprioception to be the basis for the constitution of an exteriority. The third part, which is more prospective, suggests that it is important to take the measure of the phylogenetic history of this exteriority, starting from unicellular organisms. Taking into account the literature which attests the existence of proprioception even amongst the most elementary living organisms, this leads us to propose that the coupling of proprioception to action is very primitive, and that the role we propose for it in the co-constitution of an exteriority and self is probably already at work in the simplest living organisms.
本文对认知系统构成自我与世界区分的条件提出了理论反思。主要假设如下：本体感受作为一种习惯性地主要用于体验身体的感觉系统，在这里被设想为一种耦合，这种耦合对于同时构成身体自我和远程感知场是必要的。在回顾了本体感受耦合的独特特征之后，发展了三条思路。第一条思路主要受到感觉替代研究的启发，旨在强调在这种感知学习的背景下，行动的不可或缺作用。在第二部分中，该假设与对立的论点进行了检验。特别是，我们将在 Braitenberg 所谓的综合心理学的背景下讨论，在简单机器人中出现的定向行为，这些机器人可以通过严格外部的感觉调节来调节，因为这些机器人没有任何形式的“本体感受”。同样，这一部分还提供了讨论关于动作和本体感受之间的一一对应关系的论点的机会；其他人认为，由于这种严格的一一对应关系，本体感受不可能成为构成外部性的基础。第三部分更具前瞻性，它表明，从单细胞生物开始，衡量这种外部性的系统发生历史是很重要的。考虑到证明即使在最简单的生物体中也存在本体感受的文献，这使我们提出，本体感受与行动的耦合非常原始，并且我们在共同构成外部性和自我中赋予它的作用可能已经在最简单的生物体中发挥作用了。
