Pham-Kanter Genevieve
Drexel University School of Public Health.
Milbank Q. 2014 Sep;92(3):446-70. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12073.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Safety and Innovation Act has recently relaxed conflict-of-interest rules for FDA advisory committee members, but concerns remain about the influence of members' financial relationships on the FDA's drug approval process. Using a large newly available data set, this study carefully examined the relationship between the financial interests of FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) advisory committee members and whether members voted in a way favorable to these interests.
The study used a data set of voting behavior and reported financial interests of 1,379 FDA advisory committee members who voted in CDER committee meetings that were convened during the 15-year period of 1997-2011. Data on 1,168 questions and 15,739 question-votes from 379 meetings were used in the analyses. Multivariable logit models were used to estimate the relationship between committee members' financial interests and their voting behavior.
Individuals with financial interests solely in the sponsoring firm were more likely to vote in favor of the sponsor than members with no financial ties (OR = 1.49, p = 0.03). Members with interests in both the sponsoring firm and its competitors were no more likely to vote in favor of the sponsor than those with no financial ties to any potentially affected firm (OR = 1.16, p = 0.48). Members who served on advisory boards solely for the sponsor were significantly more likely to vote in favor of the sponsor (OR = 4.97, p = 0.005).
There appears to be a pro-sponsor voting bias among advisory committee members who have exclusive financial relationships with the sponsoring firm but not among members who have nonexclusive financial relationships (ie, those with ties to both the sponsor and its competitors). These findings point to important heterogeneities in financial ties and suggest that policymakers will need to be nuanced in their management of financial relationships of FDA advisory committee members.
美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)的《安全与创新法案》最近放宽了对FDA咨询委员会成员的利益冲突规则,但成员的财务关系对FDA药品审批程序的影响仍令人担忧。本研究利用一个新近可得的大型数据集,仔细考察了FDA药品评价与研究中心(CDER)咨询委员会成员的财务利益与成员是否以有利于这些利益的方式进行投票之间的关系。
该研究使用了一个关于1997年至2011年这15年期间在CDER委员会会议上投票的1379名FDA咨询委员会成员的投票行为和报告的财务利益的数据集。分析中使用了来自379次会议的1168个问题和15739次问题投票的数据。多变量逻辑回归模型用于估计委员会成员的财务利益与其投票行为之间的关系。
仅在申办公司拥有财务利益的个人比没有财务关系的成员更有可能投票支持申办方(比值比=1.49,p=0.03)。在申办公司及其竞争对手都拥有利益的成员并不比与任何可能受影响公司没有财务关系的成员更有可能投票支持申办方(比值比=1.16,p=0.48)。仅为申办方担任咨询委员会成员的人明显更有可能投票支持申办方(比值比=4.97,p=0.005)。
在与申办公司有排他性财务关系的咨询委员会成员中似乎存在支持申办方的投票偏见,但在具有非排他性财务关系的成员(即与申办方及其竞争对手都有关系的成员)中则不存在。这些发现指出了财务关系中的重要异质性,并表明政策制定者在管理FDA咨询委员会成员的财务关系时需要更加细致入微。