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质量调整生命年与伦理学:一位卫生经济学家的视角

QALYS and ethics: a health economist's perspective.

作者信息

Williams A

机构信息

Centre for Health Economics, University of York, UK.

出版信息

Soc Sci Med. 1996 Dec;43(12):1795-804. doi: 10.1016/s0277-9536(96)00082-2.

Abstract

Objectors on ethical grounds to the use of QALYs in priority-setting in public health care systems are here categorised as (1) those who reject all collective priority-setting as unethical; (2) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting but believe that it is contrary to medical ethics; (3) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting and do not believe that it is contrary to medical ethics, but reject the role of QALYs in it on other ethical grounds; and (4) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting in principle, but are unwilling to specify how it should be done in practice. It is argued that the first two groups of objectors are simply wrong, if distributive justice is a proper ethical concern in this context. The third group is of more interest, as this group appears to believe that QALYs are unethical because it is unethical to regard QALY maximisation as the sole objective of the health care system. This paper argues that QALYs are relevant to a much wider range of objectives than QALY maximisation, and that they can accommodate a wide variety of health dimensions and sources of valuation. They can also accommodate the differential weighting of benefits according to who gets them, so they do not commit their users to any particular notion of distributive justice. What they do commit their users to is the notion that the health of people is a central concept in priority-setting, and that it is desirable, for reasons of accountability, to have the bases for such priority-setting made as precise and explicit as possible. The fourth group of objectors needs to acknowledge that there is no perfect system on offer, and since priority-setting does and will proceed willy-nilly we cannot wait until there is. It would be more constructive to set up the desiderata that a priority-setting system should ideally fulfil, and then appraise all feasible alternatives (including the status quo) even-handedly by those criteria. None will be perfect, but this author predicts that QALYs would emerge from such an appraisal with a significant role to play.

摘要

基于伦理理由反对在公共卫生保健系统的优先事项设定中使用质量调整生命年(QALYs)的人在此被归类为:(1)那些将所有集体优先事项设定都视为不道德而予以拒绝的人;(2)那些承认需要进行集体优先事项设定,但认为这有悖于医学伦理的人;(3)那些承认需要进行集体优先事项设定,且不认为这有悖于医学伦理,但基于其他伦理理由拒绝质量调整生命年在其中所起作用的人;以及(4)那些原则上承认需要进行集体优先事项设定,但不愿具体说明在实践中应如何进行的人。有人认为,如果分配正义在这种情况下是一个恰当的伦理关切,那么前两组反对者完全错误。第三组更值得关注,因为这一组似乎认为质量调整生命年不道德,是因为将质量调整生命年最大化作为医疗保健系统的唯一目标是不道德的。本文认为,质量调整生命年与比质量调整生命年最大化更广泛的一系列目标相关,并且它们能够兼顾各种健康维度和评估来源。它们还能根据受益对象对益处进行差别加权,所以并不要求使用者遵循任何特定的分配正义观念。它们确实要求使用者认同的观念是,人的健康是优先事项设定中的核心概念,并且出于问责的原因,应尽可能精确和明确地确定此类优先事项设定的依据。第四组反对者需要认识到不存在完美的系统可供选择,而且由于优先事项设定无论如何都会进行,我们不能等到有了完美系统才行动。更具建设性的做法是确定一个优先事项设定系统理想情况下应满足的 desiderata,然后根据这些标准公正地评估所有可行的替代方案(包括现状)。没有一个会是完美的,但作者预测,质量调整生命年将在这样的评估中发挥重要作用而脱颖而出。

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