Ahuja Jyoti
Teaching Associate, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK Chartered Clinical Psychologist, Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust, Birmingham, UK
Med Law Rev. 2015 Winter;23(1):27-52. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwu018. Epub 2014 Sep 14.
This article examines the judicial approach to emotional harm claims from a medical perspective. Legal rules in this area are already recognised as being illogical and incoherent. Psychological and psychiatric research illustrate that they also conflict with empirical findings. By basing claims on erroneous criteria, courts may deny liability in meritorious cases, and impose liability in possibly less deserving claims. This not only brings the law into disrepute, but also reinforces the stigma that surrounds mental illness, and does disservice to an already misunderstood and vulnerable section of people in society. The article examines the evidence for the threshold requirement that distress must qualify for a psychiatric diagnosis to be actionable, and for the Alcock secondary victim criteria. It contends that these legal rules are based in misconceptions about mental illness and trauma, and suggests an alternative approach that is more principled, yet also addresses policy concerns about excessive liability.
本文从医学角度审视了对情感伤害索赔的司法处理方式。该领域的法律规则已被认为不合逻辑且缺乏连贯性。心理学和精神病学研究表明,这些规则也与实证研究结果相冲突。由于索赔基于错误的标准,法院可能在有价值的案件中拒绝承担责任,而在可能不太值得的索赔中判定承担责任。这不仅使法律声誉受损,还强化了围绕精神疾病的污名化,并且对社会中本就被误解且脆弱的一部分人造成了伤害。本文考察了关于痛苦必须符合精神病诊断才能提起诉讼的门槛要求以及阿尔科克案中关于第二受害者标准的证据。它认为这些法律规则基于对精神疾病和创伤的误解,并提出了一种更具原则性的替代方法,同时也解决了对过度责任的政策担忧。