School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh, EH8 9YL, UK.
J Bioeth Inq. 2024 Jun;21(2):217-224. doi: 10.1007/s11673-024-10346-y. Epub 2024 May 22.
On January 11, 2024, the United Kingdom (U.K.) Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, restricting the circumstances in which "secondary victims" can successfully claim for damages in clinical negligence cases. This ruling has provided welcome clarity regarding the scope of negligently caused "pure" psychiatric illness claims, but the judgment may well prove controversial. In this article, I trace the facts and opinion from the majority and also discuss an important dissenting opinion. I then reflect on what the ruling means for psychiatric illness claims by secondary victims, and more broadly on the implications for clinical negligence law. I suggest that while much-needed clarity has been injected in this area of the law, it is difficult, reading the majority of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the restricted scope of a medical practitioner's duty, to envision a scenario in which secondary victim could ever succeed in a clinical negligence context.
2024 年 1 月 11 日,英国最高法院在 Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust 一案中做出判决,限制了“次生受害者”在临床过失案件中成功索赔的情形。这一裁决为过失导致的“纯粹”精神疾病索赔的范围提供了明确的信息,但该判决很可能引发争议。在本文中,我追溯了多数意见的事实和观点,并对一个重要的异议意见进行了讨论。然后,我反思了这一判决对次生受害者的精神疾病索赔意味着什么,以及更广泛地对临床过失法的影响。我认为,尽管该领域的法律急需明确,但从最高法院多数意见对医生职责的有限范围的强调来看,很难想象次生受害者在临床过失背景下会有成功的可能。