IEEE Trans Cybern. 2015 Oct;45(10):2190-201. doi: 10.1109/TCYB.2014.2366971. Epub 2014 Nov 25.
In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.
在自组织移动自组网 (MANET) 中，网络功能依赖于自利节点的协作，其中一个挑战是强制实施它们的相互协作。在本文中，我们研究了由于数据包丢失和传输噪声观测而导致的单跳不可靠信道中的协作数据包转发。我们基于进化博弈论提出了一种间接互惠框架，并在结构化和非结构化 MANET 中强制实施数据包转发策略的协作。此外，我们分析了协作策略的进化动态，并推导出了收益与成本比的阈值，以保证协作的收敛性。数值模拟验证了当利他主义的收益与成本比超过临界条件时，所提出的基于进化博弈论的解决方案可以强制实施协作。此外，我们还测量了所提出策略在结构化 MANET 中的网络吞吐量性能，其与完全协作策略的性能非常吻合。
