Moses Vinu, Korah Ipeson
1 Both authors: Department of Radiology, Christian Medical College, Vellore, Dr. Ida Scudder Rd, Vellore 632004, Tamil Nadu, India.
AJR Am J Roentgenol. 2015 Feb;204(2):343-53. doi: 10.2214/AJR.14.12882.
OBJECTIVE. There are few articles in the literature describing the security and safety aspects of networked medical equipment in radiology departments. Most radiologists are unaware of the security issues. We review the security of the networked medical equipment of a typical radiology department. MATERIALS AND METHODS. All networked medical equipment in a radiology department was scanned for vulnerabilities with a port scanner and a network vulnerability scanner, and the vulnerabilities were classified using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System. A network sniffer was used to capture and analyze traffic on the radiology network for exposure of confidential patient data. We reviewed the use of antivirus software and firewalls on the networked medical equipment. USB ports and CD and DVD drives in the networked medical equipment were tested to see whether they allowed unauthorized access. Implementation of the virtual private network (VPN) that vendors use to access the radiology network was reviewed. RESULTS. Most of the networked medical equipment in our radiology department used vulnerable software with open ports and services. Of the 144 items scanned, 64 (44%) had at least one critical vulnerability, and 119 (83%) had at least one high-risk vulnerability. Most equipment did not encrypt traffic and allowed capture of confidential patient data. Of the 144 items scanned, two (1%) used antivirus software and three (2%) had a firewall enabled. The USB ports were not secure on 49 of the 58 (84%) items with USB ports, and the CD or DVD drive was not secure on 17 of the 31 (55%) items with a CD or DVD drive. One of three vendors had an insecure implementation of VPN access. CONCLUSION. Radiologists and the medical industry need to urgently review and rectify the security issues in existing networked medical equipment. We hope that the results of our study and this article also raise awareness among radiologists about the security issues of networked medical equipment.
目的。文献中很少有文章描述放射科联网医疗设备的安全性和安保方面。大多数放射科医生并不知晓安全问题。我们对一个典型放射科的联网医疗设备的安全性进行了评估。材料与方法。使用端口扫描器和网络漏洞扫描器对放射科的所有联网医疗设备进行漏洞扫描,并使用通用漏洞评分系统对漏洞进行分类。使用网络嗅探器捕获并分析放射科网络上的流量,以检测是否存在患者机密数据泄露的情况。我们审查了联网医疗设备上杀毒软件和防火墙的使用情况。对联网医疗设备中的USB端口以及CD和DVD驱动器进行测试,以查看它们是否允许未经授权的访问。对供应商用于访问放射科网络的虚拟专用网络(VPN)的实施情况进行了审查。结果。我们放射科的大多数联网医疗设备使用的软件存在漏洞,端口和服务开放。在扫描的144台设备中,64台(44%)至少存在一个严重漏洞,119台(83%)至少存在一个高风险漏洞。大多数设备没有对流量进行加密,从而使得患者机密数据能够被捕获。在扫描的144台设备中,两台(1%)使用了杀毒软件,三台(2%)启用了防火墙。在58台有USB端口的设备中,49台(84%)的USB端口不安全;在31台有CD或DVD驱动器的设备中,17台(55%)的CD或DVD驱动器不安全。三家供应商中有一家对VPN访问的实施不安全。结论。放射科医生和医疗行业需要紧急审查并纠正现有联网医疗设备中的安全问题。我们希望我们的研究结果以及本文能够提高放射科医生对联网医疗设备安全问题的认识。