Belhabib Dyhia, Sumaila U Rashid, Lam Vicky W Y, Zeller Dirk, Le Billon Philippe, Abou Kane Elimane, Pauly Daniel
Sea Around Us, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, Canada.
Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, Canada.
PLoS One. 2015 Mar 20;10(3):e0118351. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0118351. eCollection 2015.
We compare the performance of European Union (EU) and Chinese fisheries access agreements with West African countries in terms of illegal and unreported fishing, economic equity, and patterns of exploitation. Bottom-up re-estimations of catch reveal that the EU (1.6 million t•year(-1)) and China (2.3 million t•year(-1)) report only 29% and 8%, respectively, of their estimated total catches (including estimated discards whenever possible) from West African countries between 2000 and 2010. EU catches are declining, while Chinese catches are increasing and are yet to reach the historic maximum level of EU catches (3 million t•year(-1) on average in the 1970s-1980s). The monetary value of EU fishing agreements, correlated in theory with reported catches, is straightforward to access, in contrast to Chinese agreements. However, once quantified, the value of Chinese agreements is readily traceable within the African economy through the different projects they directly cover, in contrast to the funds disbursed [to host governments] by the EU. Overall, China provides resources equivalent to about 4% of the ex-vessel value [value at landing] of the catch taken by Chinese distant-water fleets from West African waters, while the EU pays 8%. We address the difficulties of separating fees directly related to fishing from other economic or political motivations for Chinese fees, which could introduce a bias to the present findings as this operation is not performed for EU access fees officially related to fishing. Our study reveals that the EU and China perform similarly in terms of illegal fishing, patterns of exploitation and sustainability of resource use, while under-reporting by the EU increases and that by China decreases. The EU agreements provide, in theory, room for improving scientific research, monitoring and surveillance, suggesting a better performance than for Chinese agreements, but the end-use of the EU funds are more difficult, and sometime impossible to ascertain.
我们从非法及未报告捕捞、经济公平性和开发模式等方面，比较了欧盟（EU）与中国和西非国家签订的渔业准入协议的执行情况。自下而上重新估算的渔获量显示，欧盟（每年160万吨）和中国（每年230万吨）分别仅报告了2000年至2010年期间其从西非国家估计总渔获量（尽可能包括估计的丢弃物）的29%和8%。欧盟的渔获量在下降，而中国的渔获量在增加，且尚未达到欧盟渔获量的历史最高水平（20世纪70年代至80年代平均每年300万吨）。与中国的协议不同，欧盟渔业协议的货币价值在理论上与报告的渔获量相关，易于获取。然而，一旦量化，中国协议的价值通过其直接涵盖的不同项目，在非洲经济中很容易追踪，这与欧盟[向东道国政府]支付的资金不同。总体而言，中国提供的资源约相当于其远洋捕捞船队从西非水域捕捞的渔获物上岸价值的4%，而欧盟支付的比例为8%。我们解决了将与捕捞直接相关的费用与中国收费的其他经济或政治动机区分开来的困难，这可能会给当前的研究结果带来偏差，因为欧盟与捕捞正式相关的准入费用并未进行此项操作。我们的研究表明，欧盟和中国在非法捕捞、开发模式和资源利用可持续性方面表现相似，而欧盟的少报情况增加，中国的少报情况减少。理论上，欧盟的协议为改善科学研究、监测和监督提供了空间，表明其表现优于中国的协议，但欧盟资金的最终用途更难确定，有时甚至无法查明。
