Carruthers Peter
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20912, United States.
Conscious Cogn. 2015 Nov;36:498-507. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.009. Epub 2015 Apr 29.
This paper argues that our awareness of the mental states of other agents is often perceptual in character. It draws partly on recent experimental findings concerning perception of animacy and intentionality. But it also emphasizes the unencapsulated nature of perception generally, and argues that concepts (including mental-state concepts) can be bound into the contents of conscious perception. One of the main arguments used in support of this conclusion draws on recent work concerning the nature and contents of working memory.
本文认为，我们对其他主体心理状态的认知在性质上往往是感知性的。它部分借鉴了近期关于感知能动性和意向性的实验结果。但它也强调了感知总体上的非封装性，并认为概念（包括心理状态概念）可以被整合到有意识感知的内容中。支持这一结论的主要论据之一借鉴了近期关于工作记忆的性质和内容的研究。
