de Bruin Leon, Strijbos Derek
Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 6500 HD Nijmegen, Netherlands.
Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 6500 HD Nijmegen, Netherlands.
Conscious Cogn. 2015 Nov;36:565-70. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.014. Epub 2015 May 7.
Mindreading accounts of social cognition typically claim that we cannot directly perceive the mental states of other agents and therefore have to exercise certain cognitive capacities in order to infer them. In recent years this view has been challenged by proponents of the direct social perception (DSP) thesis, who argue that the mental states of other agents can be directly perceived. In this paper we show, first, that the main disagreement between proponents of DSP and mindreading accounts has to do with the so-called 'sandwich model' of social cognition. Although proponents of DSP are critical of this model, we argue that they still seem to accept the distinction between perception, cognition and action that underlies it. Second, we contrast the sandwich model of social cognition with an alternative theoretical framework that is becoming increasingly popular in the cognitive neurosciences: Bayesian Predictive Coding (BPC). We show that the BPC framework renders a principled distinction between perception, cognition and action obsolete, and can accommodate elements of both DSP and mindreading accounts.
关于社会认知的读心术解释通常认为，我们无法直接感知其他主体的心理状态，因此必须运用某些认知能力来推断它们。近年来，这种观点受到了直接社会感知（DSP）理论支持者的挑战，他们认为其他主体的心理状态是可以直接感知的。在本文中，我们首先表明，DSP支持者与读心术解释之间的主要分歧与社会认知的所谓“三明治模型”有关。尽管DSP支持者对该模型持批评态度，但我们认为他们似乎仍然接受其背后的感知、认知和行动之间的区分。其次，我们将社会认知的三明治模型与认知神经科学中越来越流行的另一种理论框架——贝叶斯预测编码（BPC）进行对比。我们表明，BPC框架使感知、认知和行动之间的原则性区分过时了，并且可以容纳DSP和读心术解释的要素。
