Lavelle Jane Suilin
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
Conscious Cogn. 2015 Nov;36:508-18. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.017. Epub 2015 Feb 11.
The Direct Social Perception Hypothesis maintains that we can perceive other people's psychological states. Furthermore, it claims that doing so does not require any cognitive process that is simulative or theory-like, putting it in sharp contrast with mainstream accounts of social cognition. This paper contrasts the DSPH against the modular account of mindreading as proposed by Peter Carruthers and H. Clark Barrett. It maintains that the modularity view can respond to the challenges levelled by the DSPH, and that the positions are not as distinct as they originally appear. Finally, the paper discusses the role of non-folk psychological state concepts in our perceptions of other people.
直接社会感知假说认为，我们能够感知他人的心理状态。此外，该假说还声称，做到这一点并不需要任何模拟性或类似理论的认知过程，这与社会认知的主流观点形成了鲜明对比。本文将直接社会感知假说与彼得·卡鲁瑟斯和H. 克拉克·巴雷特提出的读心术模块化观点进行了对比。本文认为，模块化观点能够回应直接社会感知假说提出的挑战，而且这两种观点并不像它们最初看起来的那样截然不同。最后，本文讨论了非民间心理状态概念在我们对他人的感知中的作用。
