Kochan Jeff
Zukunftskolleg, Box 216, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2015 Feb;49:103-7. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.10.004. Epub 2014 Nov 15.
Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of "circulating reference." Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.
布鲁诺·拉图尔声称,他已经表明,一种他描述为试图将一个脱离肉体的先验主体与一个无法触及的自在之物统一起来的康德式知识模型,在对实际科学的实证研究中被戏剧性地证伪了。相反,拉图尔将重点放在科学实践上,并用一种“循环指涉”模型取代了这种康德式模型。不幸的是,拉图尔的替代图式遗漏了科学主体。我通过一个简单的机械程序弥补了这一疏忽。通过对拉图尔理论的图示表示稍作改动,我发现了一个后康德式科学主体的新空间,这个主体被路德维克·弗莱克精彩地描述过。这样,被忽视的科学主体性和无休止的实践就重新结合在一起了。