Neumann J
Sudhoffs Arch. 1989;73(1):12-25.
Ludwik Fleck has shown in his discussion of the logical empirism of the Vienna Circle that his concept of reality presupposes an unproven logico-structural correspondence between the world and the formal logical structure of language, i.e. between reality and thought. Upon this questionable foundation he proceeds to develop his own position concerning the theory of medical science. He claims that scientific knowledge is at no time exempt from cultural, historical and social conditions, of which scientific knowledge itself is a function. These conditions find expression in the style of thought of a particular epoch ("Denkstil") as well as in the interaction of the participating scientists ("Denkkollektiv"). Flecks merits for having explicated the conditionality of the process of scientific knowledge over against positivistic thought have been honourably elaborated in many studies. The present study offers an analysis of the manner in which the Fleck position attempts to serve as an explanation of change in the content and style of thought in history. It will be made clear that these changes and developments can only be explained as the result of the interaction and competition among the collectives of scientists and thinkers. Fleck deprives his socio-historical position of its logical foundation by radicalizing these conditions in such a manner that they become fundamental determinants of human thought generally and for the individual scientist particularly. As a consequence, from the perspective in which the thought of the individual is thus determined, he can neither establish a convincing theory for changes in thought in history nor for the human relations obtaining within the collective of scientists and thinkers.