Kauffman Stuart A, Gare Arran
The Institute for Systems Biology, Seattle, WA, USA.
Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry, Swinburne University, Hawthorn, Victoria, Australia.
Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015 Dec;119(3):219-44. doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.06.003. Epub 2015 Jul 2.
Attempts to 'naturalize' phenomenology challenge both traditional phenomenology and traditional approaches to cognitive science. They challenge Edmund Husserl's rejection of naturalism and his attempt to establish phenomenology as a foundational transcendental discipline, and they challenge efforts to explain cognition through mainstream science. While appearing to be a retreat from the bold claims made for phenomenology, it is really its triumph. Naturalized phenomenology is spearheading a successful challenge to the heritage of Cartesian dualism. This converges with the reaction against Cartesian thought within science itself. Descartes divided the universe between res cogitans, thinking substances, and res extensa, the mechanical world. The latter won with Newton and we have, in most of objective science since, literally lost our mind, hence our humanity. Despite Darwin, biologists remain children of Newton, and dream of a grand theory that is epistemologically complete and would allow lawful entailment of the evolution of the biosphere. This dream is no longer tenable. We now have to recognize that science and scientists are within and part of the world we are striving to comprehend, as proponents of endophysics have argued, and that physics, biology and mathematics have to be reconceived accordingly. Interpreting quantum mechanics from this perspective is shown to both illuminate conscious experience and reveal new paths for its further development. In biology we must now justify the use of the word "function". As we shall see, we cannot prestate the ever new biological functions that arise and constitute the very phase space of evolution. Hence, we cannot mathematize the detailed becoming of the biosphere, nor write differential equations for functional variables we do not know ahead of time, nor integrate those equations, so no laws "entail" evolution. The dream of a grand theory fails. In place of entailing laws, a post-entailing law explanatory framework is proposed in which Actuals arise in evolution that constitute new boundary conditions that are enabling constraints that create new, typically unprestatable, Adjacent Possible opportunities for further evolution, in which new Actuals arise, in a persistent becoming. Evolution flows into a typically unprestatable succession of Adjacent Possibles. Given the concept of function, the concept of functional closure of an organism making a living in its world, becomes central. Implications for patterns in evolution include historical reconstruction, and statistical laws such as the distribution of extinction events, or species per genus, and the use of formal cause, not efficient cause, laws.
将现象学“自然化”的尝试对传统现象学和认知科学的传统方法都构成了挑战。它们质疑埃德蒙德·胡塞尔对自然主义的拒斥以及他将现象学确立为一门基础先验学科的企图,也质疑通过主流科学来解释认知的努力。虽然这看似是对现象学所提出的大胆主张的一种退缩,但实际上却是它的胜利。自然化现象学正在引领一场对笛卡尔二元论遗产的成功挑战。这与科学自身内部对笛卡尔思想的反思相契合。笛卡尔将宇宙划分为思维实体(res cogitans)和机械世界(res extensa)。后者随着牛顿而占据主导,自那以后,在大多数客观科学中,我们实际上已经失去了我们的心智,进而失去了我们的人性。尽管有达尔文,但生物学家仍然是牛顿的追随者,梦想着有一个在认识论上完备且能对生物圈的进化进行合法推导的宏大理论。这个梦想已不再站得住脚。我们现在必须认识到,正如内物理学的支持者所主张的那样,科学和科学家处于我们正在努力理解的世界之中并且是这个世界的一部分,而且物理学、生物学和数学必须据此重新构想。从这个角度解释量子力学既能够阐明意识体验,又能为其进一步发展揭示新的路径。在生物学中,我们现在必须为“功能”一词的使用提供依据。正如我们将会看到的,我们无法预先陈述不断出现并构成进化相空间的全新生物功能。因此,我们无法将生物圈的详细演变过程数学化,也无法为那些我们事先并不知晓的功能变量写出微分方程,更无法对这些方程进行积分,所以不存在“推导”进化的定律。宏大理论的梦想破灭了。取而代之的是一种后推导定律的解释框架,在这个框架中,在进化过程中会出现实际情况,这些实际情况构成新的边界条件,而这些边界条件是促成性约束,它们为进一步进化创造新的、通常无法预先陈述的相邻可能机会,在这种情况下会出现新的实际情况,呈现出持续的演变。进化流入一系列通常无法预先陈述的相邻可能情况。鉴于功能的概念,生物体在其世界中维持生存的功能封闭概念变得至关重要。对进化模式的影响包括历史重构,以及诸如灭绝事件分布或属内物种数量等统计定律,还有形式因(而非动力因)定律的运用。