Ladbury Georgia A F, Van Leuken Jeroen P G, Swart Arno, Vellema Piet, Schimmer Barbara, Ter Schegget Ronald, Van der Hoek Wim
Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), PO Box 1, , 3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Tomtebodavägen 11a, 171 83, Stockholm, Sweden.
BMC Infect Dis. 2015 Sep 3;15:372. doi: 10.1186/s12879-015-1083-9.
In spring 2008, a goat farm experiencing Q fever abortions ("Farm A") was identified as the probable source of a human Q fever outbreak in a Dutch town. In 2009, a larger outbreak with 347 cases occurred in the town, despite no clinical Q fever being reported from any local farm.
Our study aimed to identify the source of the 2009 outbreak by applying a combination of interdisciplinary methods, using data from several sources and sectors, to investigate seventeen farms in the area: namely, descriptive epidemiology of notified cases; collation of veterinary data regarding the seventeen farms; spatial attack rate and relative risk analyses; and GIS mapping of farms and smooth incidence of cases. We conducted further spatio-temporal analyses that integrated temporal data regarding date of onset with spatial data from an atmospheric dispersion model with the most highly suspected source at the centre.
Our analyses indicated that Farm A was again the most likely source of infection, with persons living within 1 km of the farm at a 46 times larger risk of being a case compared to those living within 5-10 km. The spatio-temporal analyses demonstrated that about 60 - 65 % of the cases could be explained by aerosol transmission from Farm A assuming emission from week 9; these explained cases lived significantly closer to the farm than the unexplained cases (p = 0.004). A visit to Farm A revealed that there had been no particular changes in management during the spring/summer of 2009, nor any animal health problems around the time of parturition or at any other time during the year.
We conclude that the probable source of the 2009 outbreak was the same farm implicated in 2008, despite animal health indicators being absent. Veterinary and public health professionals should consider farms with past as well as current history of Q fever as potential sources of human outbreaks.
2008年春季,一家出现Q热流产疫情的山羊养殖场(“农场A”)被确定为荷兰一个城镇人类Q热疫情的可能源头。2009年,该城镇发生了一起有347例病例的更大规模疫情,尽管当地各农场均未报告临床Q热病例。
我们的研究旨在通过应用跨学科方法组合来确定2009年疫情的源头,利用来自多个来源和部门的数据,对该地区的17个农场进行调查:即报告病例的描述性流行病学;17个农场的兽医数据整理;空间发病率和相对风险分析;以及农场的地理信息系统(GIS)绘图和病例的平滑发病率。我们进行了进一步的时空分析,将发病日期的时间数据与以最可疑源头为中心的大气扩散模型的空间数据相结合。
我们的分析表明,农场A再次是最可能的感染源,居住在距农场1公里范围内的人成为病例的风险是居住在5 - 10公里范围内的人的46倍。时空分析表明,假设从第9周开始排放,约60 - 65%的病例可由农场A的气溶胶传播解释;这些可解释的病例居住得比无法解释的病例离农场显著更近(p = 0.004)。对农场A的一次走访显示,2009年春夏季期间管理没有特别变化,分娩前后或一年中的任何其他时间也没有任何动物健康问题。
我们得出结论,尽管缺乏动物健康指标,但2009年疫情的可能源头与2008年涉及的是同一家农场。兽医和公共卫生专业人员应将有Q热既往史和当前史的农场视为人类疫情的潜在源头。