McAuliffe Katherine, Wrangham Richard, Glowacki Luke, Russell Andrew F
Department of Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06520, USA Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 11 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 11 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2015 Dec 5;370(1683):20150012. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0012.
Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in--and provide testable hypotheses of--two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?
生活中有大量同种个体为了共同目标积极合作的例子，尽管在每个个体应贡献多少方面预计会存在利益冲突。数学模型通常发现，这种冲突可以通过部分响应策略来解决，从而使投资者的贡献相对公平。通过案例研究方法，我们表明，这种模型预期在至少四个不同的情境中可能会被推翻：（i）双亲照料；（ii）合作繁殖；（iii）合作狩猎；以及（iv）人类合作。我们强调：（a）贡献的显著差异很常见；（b）个体通常对他人的贡献做出积极而非消极的反应。现有模型在解释这些现象方面的能力出人意料地有限。在此，我们提出，尽管合作贡献的个体间差异会受到不同成本和收益的影响，但很可能存在强大的遗传或表观遗传成分。然后我们指出，当高贡献者（关键个体）的贡献通过增加他人的收益和/或降低成本来促进支持时，选择可以维持这些高贡献者的存在。我们的目的是提高人们对合作 ventures 中两个最难以理解但又不可或缺的问题的认识，并提供可检验的假设：为什么个体的贡献会有所不同，以及合作何时会引发更多合作？
Zotero 插件
