Szolnoki Attila, Chen Xiaojie
Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2015 Oct;92(4):042813. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.92.042813. Epub 2015 Oct 27.
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for nonparticipants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments but in fact results in a surprisingly high average payoff for group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant strategies or two-strategy alliances can characterize the final state of evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in structured populations highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.
当背叛行为被揭露时退出联合企业始终是避免被剥削的可行选择。虽然独自行动的策略有助于群体避免陷入公地悲剧状态，但对于不参与者来说，它只能带来微薄的收入。在本文中，我们证明了对背叛者表现出一定的宽容不仅能在恶劣环境中挽救合作，而且实际上能为公地博弈中的群体成员带来出奇高的平均收益。相图和潜在的空间模式揭示了演化状态的高度复杂性，其中循环主导策略或双策略联盟可以表征演化的最终状态。我们确定了微观机制，这些机制导致了包含宽容参与者的全局解决方案的优越性。这种现象是稳健的，在充分混合的群体和结构化群体中都能观察到，凸显了宽容在我们日常生活中的重要性。
