Divide-and-conquer Tournament on Social Networks.

In social gaming networks, previous studies extensively investigated the influence of a variety of strategies on reciprocal behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma game. The studied frameworks range from the case that an individual uniformly cooperates or defects with all social contacts, to the recently reported divide-and-conquer games, where an individual can choose a particular move to play with each neighbor. In this paper, we investigate a divide-and-conquer tournament among 14 well-known strategies on social gaming networks. In the tournament, an individual's fitness is measured by accumulated and average payoff aggregated for a certain number of rounds. On the base of their fitness, the evolution of the population follows a local learning mechanism. Our observation indicates that the distribution of individuals adopting a strategy in degree ranking fundamentally changes the frequency of the strategy. In the divide-and-conquer gaming networks, our result suggests that the connectivity in social networks and strategy are two key factors that govern the evolution of the population.