Frápolli Maria J, Villanueva Neftalí
Department of Philosophy, University College London London, UK ; Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada Granada, Spain.
Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada Granada, Spain.
Front Psychol. 2015 Nov 24;6:1788. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01788. eCollection 2015.
The purpose of this paper is to show that, pace (Field, 2009), MacFarlane's assessment relativism and expressivism should be sharply distinguished. We do so by arguing that relativism and expressivism exemplify two very different approaches to context-dependence. Relativism, on the one hand, shares with other contemporary approaches a bottom-up, building block, model, while expressivism is part of a different tradition, one that might include Lewis' epistemic contextualism and Frege's content individuation, with which it shares an organic model to deal with context-dependence. The building-block model and the organic model, and thus relativism and expressivism, are set apart with the aid of a particular test: only the building-block model is compatible with the idea that there might be analytically equivalent, and yet different, propositions.
本文的目的在于表明，与（菲尔德，2009）不同，麦法兰的评估相对主义和表达主义应被严格区分开来。我们通过论证相对主义和表达主义体现了两种截然不同的处理语境依赖性的方法来做到这一点。一方面，相对主义与其他当代方法一样，采用自下而上的、积木式的模型，而表达主义则属于不同的传统，这个传统可能包括刘易斯的认知语境主义和弗雷格的内容个体化，表达主义与它们共享一种处理语境依赖性的有机模型。借助一项特定测试，积木式模型和有机模型得以区分，进而相对主义和表达主义也被区分开来：只有积木式模型与以下观点兼容，即可能存在分析上等价但却不同的命题。
