Paul College of Business & Economics, University of New Hampshire.
Kogod School of Business, American University.
J Appl Psychol. 2016 May;101(5):605-24. doi: 10.1037/apl0000072. Epub 2015 Dec 14.
Recent research indicates that expressing anger elicits concession making from negotiating counterparts. When emotions are conveyed either by a computer program or by a confederate, results appear to affirm a long-standing notion that feigning anger is an effective bargaining tactic. We hypothesize this tactic actually jeopardizes postnegotiation deal implementation and subsequent exchange. Four studies directly test both tactical and strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation. False representations of anger generated little tactical benefit but produced considerable and persistent strategic disadvantage. This disadvantage is because of an effect we call "blowback." A negotiator's misrepresented anger creates an action-reaction cycle that results in genuine anger and diminishes trust in both the negotiator and counterpart. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the strategic implications of emotional misrepresentation for negotiators interested in claiming value. We discuss the benefits of researching reciprocal interdependence between 2 or more negotiating parties and of modeling value creation beyond deal construction to include implementation of terms. (PsycINFO Database Record
最近的研究表明，表达愤怒会促使谈判对手做出让步。无论是通过计算机程序还是通过同谋来传达情绪，结果似乎都证实了一个长期存在的观点，即假装愤怒是一种有效的谈判策略。我们假设这种策略实际上会危及谈判后的协议执行和后续交流。四项研究直接检验了情绪错误表达的策略和战略后果。愤怒的虚假表达几乎没有带来战术上的好处，但却产生了相当大且持续的战略劣势。这种劣势是由于我们称之为“反冲”的影响。谈判者的错误表达的愤怒会产生一个行动-反应的循环，导致真正的愤怒，并降低对谈判者和对手的信任。我们的研究结果强调了对于有兴趣主张价值的谈判者来说，考虑情绪错误表达的战略影响的重要性。我们讨论了研究两个或更多谈判方之间互惠依存关系以及超越交易结构建模价值创造以包括条款执行的好处。
