Shou Wenying
Division of Basic Sciences, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, United States.
Elife. 2015 Dec 29;4:e10106. doi: 10.7554/eLife.10106.
Cooperators who pay a cost to produce publically-available benefits can be exploited by cheaters who do not contribute fairly. How might cooperation persist against cheaters? Two classes of mechanisms are known to promote cooperation: 'partner choice', where a cooperator preferentially interacts with cooperative over cheating partners; and 'partner fidelity feedback', where repeated interactions between individuals ensure that cheaters suffer as their cooperative partners languish (see, for example, Momeni et al., 2013). However when both mechanisms can act, differentiating them has generated controversy. Here, I resolve this controversy by noting that selection can operate on organismal and sub-organismal 'entities' such that partner fidelity feedback at sub-organismal level can appear as partner choice at organismal level. I also show that cooperation between multicellular eukaryotes and mitochondria is promoted by partner fidelity feedback and partner choice between sub-organismal entities, in addition to being promoted by partner fidelity feedback between hosts and symbionts, as was previously known.
为产生公共利益而付出代价的合作者可能会被不公平贡献的作弊者利用。合作如何在面对作弊者时持续存在?已知有两类机制可促进合作:“伙伴选择”,即合作者优先与合作型伙伴而非作弊型伙伴互动;以及“伙伴忠诚度反馈”,即个体之间的重复互动确保作弊者会因其合作型伙伴的衰落而遭受损失(例如,见莫梅尼等人,2013年)。然而,当这两种机制都能起作用时,区分它们就产生了争议。在这里,我通过指出选择可以作用于生物体和亚生物体“实体”来解决这一争议,这样亚生物体层面的伙伴忠诚度反馈在生物体层面就可能表现为伙伴选择。我还表明,除了如之前所知的由宿主与共生体之间的伙伴忠诚度反馈促进之外,多细胞真核生物与线粒体之间的合作还受到亚生物体实体之间的伙伴忠诚度反馈和伙伴选择的促进。