Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology and Museum of Comparative Zoology, 26 Oxford St., Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Ecol Lett. 2011 Dec;14(12):1300-12. doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x. Epub 2011 Oct 20.
We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.
我们回顾了经济博弈论和进化生物学界面的最新研究工作，这些工作为伙伴选择、宿主制裁、伙伴忠诚度反馈和公共品的进化提供了新的见解。（1）信息不对称博弈理论表明，正确的激励机制可以使宿主筛选出寄生虫并筛选出互利共生体，从而在没有信号的情况下解释成功的伙伴选择。这些应用的范围从蚁-植物到微生物组。（2）合同理论区分了宿主对违约者反应的两个长期存在但区分不明显的解释：宿主制裁和伙伴忠诚度反馈。宿主特征选择性地惩罚行为不端的共生体，可以简约地解释为预先适应。丝兰蛾和豆科植物-根瘤菌共生体被认为是伙伴忠诚度反馈的例子。（3）公共品理论表明，在没有分类的情况下，在非亲属之间的单次社交困境中，多玩家互动中的合作可以进化。应用包括脊椎动物的警报呼叫和微生物的胞外酶。
