Fosgaard Toke R, Piovesan Marco
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark.
University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark.
PLoS One. 2015 Dec 30;10(12):e0145488. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0145488. eCollection 2015.
In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.
在本文中，我们测试了非约束性默认设置对公共物品贡献水平的影响。我们操纵决策屏幕上出现的默认数字，以促使受试者采取搭便车策略或完美条件合作策略。我们的结果表明，绝大多数受试者并未采用默认数字，但他们宣称的策略受到了默认设置的影响。此外，我们发现我们的操纵影响到了随后一个未对默认设置进行操纵的重复公共物品博弈。在此我们发现，之前看到搭便车默认设置的受试者比那些看到完美条件合作默认设置的受试者合作性显著更低。
