Lindeman Marjaana, Svedholm-Häkkinen Annika M, Riekki Tapani
Division of Cognitive Psychology and Neuropsychology, Institute of Behavioural Sciences, P.O. Box 9, University of Helsinki, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland.
Conscious Cogn. 2016 May;42:216-228. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.019. Epub 2016 Apr 1.
We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N=57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics' (or believers') afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1=33, n2=31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect "supernatural" with "imaginary". Study 3 (N=63) investigated whether participants' supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics' ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.
我们研究了怀疑论者是否持有隐性的超自然信仰或这些信仰的隐性认知基础。在研究1（N = 57）中，参与者阅读了一个关于死亡的生物学或宗教故事。故事内容对怀疑论者（或信徒）的来世信仰没有影响。研究2考察了宗教和非宗教的超自然信仰与关于超自然和宗教现象是虚构还是真实的隐性观点之间的关系（n1 = 33，n2 = 31）。对超自然信仰的认同越少，就越容易将“超自然”与“虚构”联系起来。研究3（N = 63）调查了在快速和非快速反应条件下，参与者的超自然信仰和本体论困惑是否存在差异。只有非分析性怀疑论者的本体论困惑在快速条件下有所增加。结果表明，总体而言，怀疑论者并不持有隐性的超自然信仰，但非分析性思维的怀疑论者在支持性条件下可能容易产生倾向于超自然信仰的偏见。
