Sasaki Tatsuya
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria ; Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria.
Dyn Games Appl. 2014;4(3):345-362. doi: 10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7. Epub 2013 Aug 17.
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these cases of evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional participation is not as effective under rewards as under punishment.
奖励和惩罚是常见的实用手段，可用于促进社会机构中的合作。在联合企业中，奖励和惩罚激励下合作的演变已被形式化并得到研究，主要是通过使用强制性公共品博弈。最近，佐佐木等人（2012年，《美国国家科学院院刊》109卷：1165 - 1169页）考虑了自愿参与以及制度激励，并描述了这些机制之间的相互作用如何影响公共品博弈中合作的演变。在此，我们对这些进化动力学情况进行了全面分类。具体而言，每当惩罚力度大到足以在公共品博弈为强制性的情况下导致合作与背叛的双稳态时，若公共品博弈是自愿参与的，这些惩罚最终将导致合作。在这种自愿情况下基于强制的合作的全局稳定性与在强制情况下观察到的双稳态形成了鲜明对比。我们还认为，自愿参与在奖励下不如在惩罚下有效。
