School of Statistics and Institute of National Accounts, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.
Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.
Sci Rep. 2016 Jun 24;6:28809. doi: 10.1038/srep28809.
The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individuals do not play these rational strategies overall. The goal of our study is to investigate the dynamics of human decision making in the repeated PGG with institutional incentives. We consider that an individual's contribution is affected by four factors, which are self-interest, the behavior of others, the reaction to rewards, and the reaction to punishment. We find that people on average do not react to rewards and punishment, and that self-interest and the behavior of others sufficiently explain the dynamics of human behavior. Further analysis suggests that institutional incentives promote cooperation by affecting the self-regarding preference and that the other-regarding preference seems to be independent of incentive schemes. Because individuals do not change their behavioral patterns even if they were not rewarded or punished, the mere potential to punish defectors and reward cooperators can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation.
公共物品博弈（PGG）的实证研究表明，制度奖励和制度惩罚都可以遏制搭便车行为，而且惩罚的效果强于奖励。基于纳什均衡（NE）策略或进化博弈动力学的自利模型正确地预测了哪些激励措施最有利于促进合作，但总体而言，个人并不采用这些理性策略。我们研究的目的是研究具有制度激励的重复 PGG 中人类决策的动态。我们认为，个人的贡献受到四个因素的影响，分别是自利、他人的行为、对奖励的反应和对惩罚的反应。我们发现，人们平均不会对奖励和惩罚做出反应，而自利和他人的行为足以解释人类行为的动态。进一步的分析表明，制度激励通过影响自利偏好来促进合作，而利他偏好似乎独立于激励方案。由于即使个体没有得到奖励或惩罚，他们也不会改变自己的行为模式，因此仅仅潜在地惩罚背叛者和奖励合作者就可以导致合作水平的大幅提高。
