Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
J Theor Biol. 2012 Apr 21;299:144-51. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030. Epub 2011 Aug 11.
The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized.
单次公共物品博弈扩展到包括旨在促进合作的制度激励（即奖励和/或惩罚）。结果表明，纳什均衡（NE）结果预测了这些具有连续策略空间的扩展多人博弈中部分或完全合作的行为。此外，对于一些激励方案，结果表明会出现多个 NE 结果。标准进化动力学（即复制者方程和适应性动力学的典型方程）下所有这些平衡点的稳定性特征。
