Li Yuyu, Huang Bo, Tao Fengming
College of Computer and Information Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 400047, China.
College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2016 Jun 22;13(6):622. doi: 10.3390/ijerph13060622.
In this paper, we assume that a professional pollutant treatment enterprise treats all of the pollutants emitted by multiple small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In order to determine the treatment price, SMEs can bargain with the pollutant treatment enterprise individually, or through forming alliances. We propose a bargaining game model of centralized pollutant treatment to study how the pollutant treatment price is determined through negotiation. Then, we consider that there is a moral hazard from SMEs in centralized pollutant treatment; in other words, they may break their agreement concerning their quantities of production and pollutant emissions with the pollutant treatment enterprise. We study how the pollutant treatment enterprise can prevent this by pricing mechanism design. It is found that the pollutant treatment enterprise can prevent SMEs' moral hazard through tiered pricing. If the marginal treatment cost of the pollutant treatment enterprise is a constant, SMEs could bargain with the pollutant treatment enterprise individually, otherwise, they should form a grand alliance to bargain with it as a whole.
在本文中，我们假设一家专业污染物处理企业处理多个中小企业排放的所有污染物。为了确定处理价格，中小企业可以单独与污染物处理企业进行讨价还价，也可以通过结成联盟来进行。我们提出了一个集中式污染物处理的讨价还价博弈模型，以研究污染物处理价格如何通过谈判确定。然后，我们考虑在集中式污染物处理中中小企业存在道德风险；换句话说，它们可能会违反与污染物处理企业就其产量和污染物排放量达成的协议。我们研究污染物处理企业如何通过定价机制设计来防止这种情况。研究发现，污染物处理企业可以通过分层定价来防止中小企业的道德风险。如果污染物处理企业的边际处理成本是常数，中小企业可以单独与污染物处理企业讨价还价，否则，它们应该结成一个大联盟作为一个整体与它进行讨价还价。
